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CORPORATE LAW AND THE LIMITS OF 
PRIVATE ORDERING  
JAMES D. COX

 
Solomon-like, the Delaware legislature in 2015 split the baby by 
amending the Delaware General Corporation Law to authorize forum-
selection bylaws and to prohibit charter or bylaw provisions that would 
shift to the plaintiff defense costs incurred in connection with shareholder 
suits that were not successfully concluded.
1
 In so acting, the legislature 
gave managers something they wanted, a way to deal with the scourge of 
multi-forum litigation,
2
 while pacifying the local bar that feared lucrative 
shareholder suits would disappear because of the chilling effect of a loser-
pays rule for shareholder suits. The legislature acted after the Delaware 
Court of Chancery held in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. 
Chevron Corp.
3
 that the board could, without the concurrence of the 
 
 
  Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The Author is grateful for the 
extraordinary research assistance provided by Ms. Linda Dahl in preparing this Article, as well as 
Deborah DeMott, Larry Hamermesh, and participants in the 21st Annual Institute for Law and 
Economic Policy conference and the Duke School of Law workshop for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this Article. 
 1. S. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2015), amending DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 109 (2015) 
(prohibiting fee-shifting provisions in articles of incorporation or bylaws, respectively) and adding 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2015) (authorizing forum-selection bylaws), was signed by Governor 
Jack Markell on June 24, 2015. 
 2. From 1999 to 2000, only 12 percent of deals had litigation, and most of the deal litigation 
related to Delaware firms was in Delaware. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers 
and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1250–54 (2012). Furthermore, this litigation decreased the 
likelihood of a deal closing, but also increased returns on the deals that closed, so that overall it was 
associated with an increased return for the deals. Id. at 1254. Deal-focused litigation has since 
changed. For example, Cain and Davidoff report that in 2012 there were 121 transactions over $100 
million in value, and that 111 of these deals experienced deal litigation. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. 
Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013 1–2 (The Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 236, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377001; see also ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2012 
M&A LITIGATION 1 (2013), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/9d8fd78f-7807-
485a-a8fc-4ec4182dedd6/2012-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-M-and-A.pdf (finding that in 2012, 
shareholder suits accompanied 93 percent of merger and acquisition transactions in excess of $100 
million). Moreover, about 50 percent of these deals also resulted in litigation in more than one 
jurisdiction. Cain & Davidoff, supra, at 2. For speculation on the underlying causes of these 
developments, see generally John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 605 (2012); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in 
Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053 (2013); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A 
Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. 1753 (2012). 
 3. 73 A.3d 934, 939–41 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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shareholders, adopt bylaw provisions that permitted the corporation to 
choose the forum in which a shareholder-initiated suit would be 
maintained. Subsequently, in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,
4
 
the Delaware Supreme Court, relying on the reasoning in Boilermakers, 
upheld a board-adopted bylaw that abandoned the long-maintained 
American Rule (whereby litigants bear their own litigation costs) to 
instead assign the suit’s defendant’s expenses (which in a derivative suit 
would include the corporation’s costs) to the plaintiff if the suit proved 
unsuccessful. Because such private ordering in the shadow of shareholder 
suits is not isolated to Delaware,
5
 the peace that the plaintiff’s bar has now 
reached via the Delaware legislature may only shift their once Delaware-
focused angst to other states. Moreover, the Delaware legislation is 
narrowly focused; it remains to be seen whether board-adopted bylaws can 
condition shareholder suits on a range of other actions that impede 
shareholder suits, such as standing criteria that mandate size and length of 
a plaintiff’s shareholdings or even mandate arbitration of such claims.  
Boilermakers and ATP Tour actually pose a more fundamental question 
than the substance of the board-adopted bylaws. In their wake there lurks 
the much larger question: are there limits on the power of the board of 
directors to act through the bylaws to alter the rights shareholders 
customarily enjoy? Stated differently, can the board of directors’ authority 
to amend the bylaws extend to changing both the procedural and 
substantive relationship that shareholders have with the corporation and 
the board of directors? This is the focus of this Article. 
Boilermakers and ATP Tour each reasoned from the perspective that 
the shareholders’ relationship with the corporation, and in turn their 
relationship with the board of directors, are contractual so that much of the 
shareholders’ rights can be understood to flow from certain organic 
documents, and most significantly and pervasively from the company’s 
bylaws.
6
 For Delaware corporations, the board enjoys the power to amend 
the bylaws only if granted that authority in the articles of incorporation.
7
 
With that grant of authority to the board present in both Boilermakers and 
 
 
 4. 91 A.3d 554, 557–58 (Del. 2014). 
 5. For a rich account of a challenge in Maryland to a board requiring, among other items, that 
shareholder disputes be handled through arbitration, see Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The 
Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016). 
 6.  See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 557–58; Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939–41. 
 7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2015). In contrast, most states follow the pattern of the 
Model Business Corporation Act and grant both the board of directors and the shareholders 
coextensive authority to adopt and amend the bylaws, subject to the articles of incorporation restricting 
the board’s authority. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.20(b)(1) (4th ed. 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE ORDERING 259 
 
 
 
 
ATP Tour, it was a short step for each court to conclude that the board’s 
action was pursuant to the contract shareholders had with their 
corporation, and that the power of the board to amend the bylaws carried 
with it the power to amend the shareholders’ rights.8 Repeatedly, the 
analysis used by each court referenced the contractual relationship the 
shareholders had through the articles of incorporation and the bylaws with 
their corporation;
9
 hence, that contractual relationship was subject to 
modification through the mechanism provided by the web of the articles of 
incorporation’s authorization for the board to amend the bylaws. This 
Article argues that this analysis is wrongly premised. The Article develops 
two broad points: (1) that the shareholder’s relationship is more than just a 
contract, and, (2) even if the relationship were contractual, bedrock 
contract law does not support the results reached in Boilermakers and ATP 
Tour.  
 
 
 8. See ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 557–58; Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939–41. For an incisive analysis 
of why consent cannot be found by the shareholders’ grant of authority to the board to amend the 
bylaws, see Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an Agency Lens, 57 
ARIZ. L. REV. 269, 275 (2015) (explaining that a provision in the articles of incorporation authorizing 
the board to amend the bylaws is too attenuated to constitute consent in part because “nothing in the 
DGCL or any other Delaware statute explicitly alerts investors to possible downstream impediments 
on [shareholders’] right to sue”).  
 9. Delaware’s invocation of contract principles in this context is illustrated by the following: 
[T]he board itself may act unilaterally to adopt bylaws . . . . Such a change by the board is not 
extra-contractual simply because the board acts unilaterally; rather it is the kind of change 
that the overarching statutory and contractual regime the stockholders buy into explicitly 
allows the board to make on its own. In other words, the . . . stockholders have assented to a 
contractual framework established by the DGCL and the certificate[] of incorporation 
[authorizing the board to adopt bylaws] that explicitly recognizes that stockholders will be 
bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by their board[]. 
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 956 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 In ATP Tour, the Court noted that because corporate bylaws are “‘contracts among a corporation’s 
shareholders,’ a fee-shifting provision contained in a . . . validly-enacted bylaw would . . . not be 
prohibited under Delaware common law.” ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558 (quoting Airgas, Inc. v. Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts 
among a corporation’s shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”)). 
 Boilermakers also relies on the same broad, undeveloped statement in Airgas, as well as a much 
earlier and less convincing decision, Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 152 A. 723, 728 (Del. 
1930), upholding the imposition of a right-of-first-refusal transfer restriction set forth in the bylaws 
where the corporate statute expressly authorized bylaws to restrict shares, and the shareholder acquired 
the shares with full notice of such restriction. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939 n.7. Thus, the substantive 
authority for the bylaw restricting transfer was expressly provided by state statute, so that neither 
Lawson’s facts nor its reasoning lend themselves to anything other than a substantive interpretation of 
a state statute. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE “NEXUS OF CONTRACTS” PARADIGM 
The seeds for Boilermakers and ATP Tour were sewn three decades 
ago with the metaphorical pronouncements by many commentators that 
the corporation is but a “nexus of contracts.”10 The expression is impactful 
because it is more than just a metaphor; it has substantive bite. The 
expression not only sets the course for what should be the content of 
organization law (i.e., principles should be what the parties would have 
agreed upon if bargaining were costless), but more significantly provides 
escape from those principles by allowing the parties to “opt out” of norms 
that are thereby default rules.
11
 Building on Coase’s perspective on why 
firms exist (the view holds that labor, suppliers, customers, investors, and 
managers arrange their activities to their optimal benefit), some leading 
scholars embrace private ordering as the desired norm within corporate 
law. In a world of private ordering, the state corporate statute is 
understood to have the limited role of providing default rules in those 
instances where the parties have not otherwise specified how their affairs 
or activities are to occur.
12
 Corporate participants may well not specify all 
 
 
 10. While the corporation-as-contract banner was carried by many, Frank Easterbrook and 
Daniel Fischel, as well as the celebrated article by Professors Jensen and Meckling, provided the 
intellectual foundation on which others built their multiple contributions. See generally Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 
(1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 
(1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 
(1982); Michael C. Jensen & William. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). The perspective embodied in the 
metaphor is now well entrenched. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 22 (2008) (“It has long been recognized . . . that the corporation 
. . . should be viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or set of implicit and explicit contracts.”). For an 
insightful analysis of the nuance that separates the early scholars whose collective work propelled the 
contractarian view behind the nexus-of-contracts metaphor, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus 
of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).  
 11. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 
1550–51 (1989) (arguing that so viewing corporate law is too narrow a view, as the corporation is 
thereby envisioned as merely a vehicle for wealth maximization, and the multiple other contributions 
that flow from society’s authorizing their existence are thus ignored). If courts are to be drawn into 
mediating the extent to which private ordering prevails within business organizations, this necessarily 
raises concerns regarding whether the court has the institutional competence to fully evaluate the 
social implications of attempted departures from statutory norms, particularly in the complex setting of 
the public corporation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: 
An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620–21 (1989) (discussing how a discussion 
of the mandatory-enabling nature of corporate law necessarily implicates the institutional competence 
of courts, as the question is a choice between relying on prophylactic rules and permitting private 
ordering with ex post judicial review for fairness). 
 12. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (“[Nexus of contracts] is just a shorthand for the complex arrangements of 
many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among themselves.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/7
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aspects of their relationship and accompanying rights and duties; they 
would avoid setting forth such matters when the costs of contracting 
reduce the benefits of the privately negotiated rules such that overall the ex 
ante benefits of the default rule dwarf the ex ante burdens of the 
customized rule.
13
 In any case, the default rule is tailored toward what the 
legislature believes most, but not all, of an organization’s stakeholders 
would agree to if contracting were efficient.
14
  
To nexus-of-contracts adherents, corporate rules are not mandatory but 
default rules; the parties are free to tailor the relationship to their own 
particular needs.
15
 Thus, within the nexus-of-contracts metaphor, forum 
selection, fee shifting, and mandated arbitration are just some areas, 
among many others, where parties can best tailor their needs through their 
negotiations and agreement. Broadly stated, to the nexus-of-contracts 
crowd, corporate law as provided by the state is merely facilitative of 
private bargaining. Pursuant to this view, corporate law is not public, but 
private law.
16
 In such a realm, the only issue in doubt is what constitutes 
consent among the affected parties; after all, it is bargaining that then 
results in the consent that Coase and contract theory so heavily depend 
upon as the basis for the efficiency that lies at its end. Consent is 
inextricably linked to another central assumption of such private ordering: 
the belief that the terms of the resulting contract will be fully priced into 
the shares.
17
 Even here, the champions of the nexus-of-contracts approach 
salve any unease about there being meaningful consent by their obeisance 
to the efficient pricing of the “contracts” outcomes being reflected in the 
price of a firm’s securities.18 That is, owners and others—for example, 
creditors—who believe the “bargain” may be tilted against them can 
overcome any anticipated disadvantage by discounting charges based on 
 
 
 13. The cost of contracting is not the only reason for contracts to be purposely incomplete. See 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 127 (1989) (“[W]hen one party to a contract knows more than another, the 
knowledgeable party may strategically decide not to contract around even an inefficient default. 
Because the process of contracting around a default can reveal information, the knowledgeable party 
may purposefully withhold information to get a larger piece of the smaller contractual pie.”). 
 14. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1847 (1989) (observing that departure 
from the statutory norm is most likely with respect to rules addressing problems whose “resolution 
varies significantly from company to company and when the desirable solution depends on particular 
features of each company that are better known to the parties involved than to public officials”). 
 15. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1434–36. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 1430; see Coffee, supra note 11, at 1623 (noting that a desirable requirement of 
contracting within the corporate law setting is that terms be accurately priced). 
 18.  See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1430. 
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the expected costs of any resulting unfairness or harmful contractual 
provision. Thus, any expected advantage gained by one party in 
bargaining can be expected to give rise to counterparty discounting (e.g., 
paying less for the shares or charging more for the money, goods, or 
services exchanged). 
Such pricing seems unlikely for multiple reasons. First, accurate 
pricing of an ownership interest in a corporation can be expected to occur 
only for corporate shares traded in a market that is not only 
informationally efficient but fundamentally efficient. This requires that 
there be evidence that a security’s price reflects the intrinsic value of the 
bundle of rights represented by share ownership. This level of efficiency is 
not even believed to exist among the most ardent supporters of the 
efficient market hypothesis.
19
 And, even if this condition were to exist in 
well-developed markets, vast numbers of corporations do not trade in such 
a market, if they trade at all. Second, any such pricing occurs only for 
those who acquire their shares after the amendment has been adopted; for 
earlier holders, the element of surprise necessarily accompanies 
unilaterally adopted bylaws. To be sure, there are a range of negative value 
actions that boards may embrace through the bylaws, so that the average 
estimated cost of such future action may be within the pricing process of 
any company’s shares. However, when a particular company held by a 
shareholder does embrace a negative-value bylaw amendment, there is no 
overall wealth impact on the individual shareholder if that shareholder 
holds an efficient portfolio. The realized negative-value bylaw’s impact 
for one company in that portfolio is offset by another equally weighted 
portfolio company. However, to the extent that many companies 
ultimately follow course in adopting the negative-value bylaw amendment, 
the earlier estimate will prove wrong, so that the shareholder did not 
discount enough when acquiring the shares. Thus, pricing will not provide 
ex ante means for shareholders to address this risk of share ownership. 
Third, a bylaw amendment that deals with shareholder litigation does not 
necessarily lead to negative value outcomes. For example, fee-shifting 
bylaws may well insulate corporations from the burdens of abusive 
 
 
 19. We cannot determine whether any market is fundamentally efficient, i.e., efficient such that 
trading prices reflect the intrinsic value of an asset, because it is not possible to know what is the 
asset’s intrinsic value. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). What we can observe is that information and stock prices 
can and frequently do interact in ways that suggest informational efficiency, but that does not make the 
case for the resulting prices being correctly priced in the manner envisioned by the nexus-of-contracts 
proponents. Additionally, what we can observe translates poorly to enterprises whose ownership 
interests do not trade on a market at all. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/7
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shareholder litigation. On the other hand, the provision may insulate 
managers from being accountable. Neither of these outcomes can be 
predicted when the shareholder acquires shares with only the awareness 
that the board of directors can unilaterally amend the bylaws to 
accomplish a constellation of objectives. Even the most efficient market 
cannot be prescient; thus, serious information deficiencies eviscerate the 
likelihood of pricing the impact of the board’s power over the bylaws. 
Because the term cannot be priced, it is a term that cannot be seen to enjoy 
consent in any form.
20
  
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel were early advocates for viewing 
corporate law as consensual. They placed much of their embrace on the 
nexus of contracts as being necessary for business enterprises to be 
“adaptive,” since organizations, and their actors, are themselves dynamic 
because they exist and are buffeted by an ever-changing business 
environment.
21
 Thus, businesses demand adaptive actors, and the law 
should accommodate this reality.
22
 To this end, they reason that owners 
and managers must be able to tailor their relationship to ever-changing 
circumstances.
23
 It is not clear from this reasoning why, at the same time 
that actors enjoy flexibility with respect to the conduct of the corporation’s 
business, their relationship to the firm and its shareholders, as well as their 
duties to each, cannot be predictable. There appears nothing inconsistent 
with a body of rules that allow change through deliberation and ultimately 
consent as opposed to unilateral action. Nor does it appear inconsistent for 
some actors, such as boards of directors and their appointed officers, to act 
pursuant to broad norms, such as the pervasive business judgment rule that 
accords great deference to corporate actors, while at the same time carving 
out precise areas, developed below, where meaningful consent to act is 
required. Nonetheless, Easterbrook and Fischel observe: “To say that a 
complex relation among many voluntary participants is adaptive is to say 
 
 
 20. Professor Coffee, in addressing a more focused contractual freedom issue, finds the parties’ 
ability to opt out of mandatory rules to be a reason that pricing is not possible in such an instance 
unless it is both transaction-specific and coupled with a duty of good faith. Coffee, supra note 11, at 
1664. He concludes that this would have no impact on self-dealing transactions, for under even the 
contract perspective there would be an ongoing requirement on the part of the fiduciary not to engage 
in unfair dealings with the corporation. Id. at 1665. The opposite of a specific transaction is the 
common immunity shield for directors, such as that authorized in Delaware General Corporation Law 
§ 102(b)(7); the long-term nature of the provision, and the ever-changing undertakings over that time, 
prevent past experiences from serving as a guide for measuring the provision’s costs, so that pricing 
will necessarily be inaccurate. See id. at 1667. 
 21. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1427–28.  
 22. See id. at 1428. 
 23. See id. 
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that it is contractual.”24 This statement will most certainly impress contract 
scholars as an oxymoron. As examined more fully below, an over-arching 
feature of a contract is the requirement of definiteness. Because of this 
requirement, contracts as such can hardly ever be adaptive in a way 
suggested by Easterbrook and Fischel as a desideratum for business 
organizations. Flexibility within the corporation occurs through a 
centralized board that operates under an unconstrained corporate charter 
whose decisions are insulated by overwhelming deference provided by the 
business judgment rule. The effective check on the board’s stewardship is 
not private ordering but the fact the board’s members are elected 
periodically by the residual owners focused on an objective measurement 
of performance: share price.
25
 Moreover, definiteness cannot be expected 
to be provided by “wealth maximization” serving as the North Star by 
which to measure whether expectations are being fulfilled; wealth 
maximization as a norm is too incomplete to serve as a meaningful 
reference point of the parties’ likely intent.26 Thus, contract provisions do 
not provide the desired adaptive feature of corporate organizations, 
whereas corporate governance does. 
Consent is a necessary feature for the contractual paradigm. Simply 
stated, a contract arises when and only when there is a meeting of the 
minds on the parties’ respective undertakings. Consent and contracting can 
be found within the shareholder’s relationship to the corporation. 
However, that relationship is richer and potentially more fluid than a 
contract because of a set of governance arrangements and procedures that 
permeate corporate statutes and thereby define corporate organizations.
27
 
Corporate organizations operate, and are governed, by a mixture of 
mandatory rules, contractual undertakings, fiduciary obligations, and 
foremostly through highly fluid governance mechanisms that link officers, 
directors, and residual claimants.
28
 The pervasive presence of mandatory 
rules and fiduciary duties that are applied ex post, plus the fact that many 
rules within the corporation can be the product of unilateral action by the 
corporation’s organizers and officials, erodes the descriptive power of the 
 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 
150–52 (2009). 
 26. Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1989). 
 27. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161 (2014) 
(arguing that consent is also a necessary component of governance). 
 28. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 
1487 (1989). 
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contract metaphor. No consent is present for a mandatory rule or fiduciary 
duty to apply, and unilateral action necessarily means action taken without 
consent to that action. In combination, these rules and duties reject the 
nexus-of-contracts paradigm. 
In the business organizational setting, consent so necessary for 
contracting can more easily be found within small groups. For example, 
contract-like construction of the “bargained-for” relationship appears in 
the case law of close corporation law.
29
 On further examination, most 
close corporation decisions invoking the rhetoric of contractual 
expectations are little more than holding individuals to the governance 
arrangement, as contrasted with a particular outcome they chose for 
themselves, even in instances where it would appear the legislature did not 
formally authorize that arrangement. Such case holdings or approaches do 
not place the parties solely within the realm of contract law. Quite the 
opposite occurs: contract rhetoric is used to support a governance norm, as 
most decisions involve the construction of an agreement among the parties 
and more generally support their view of the organizational arrangement 
for fulfilling their mutual aspirations. Thus, in the classic Galler v. 
Galler,
30
 the focus of the court was the validity of an agreement among the 
stockholders where, similar to other cases,
31
 the resolution of the dispute 
among owners was substantially based on the only rights that would be 
impacted by such enforcement, being solely those rights of the 
agreement’s signatories and their heirs. While appearing to resolve the 
matter along contractual lines, it emphasized there were no third-party 
interests or provisions of the corporate statute that would be impacted.
32
 
The court’s concern for the interests of third parties, such as creditors or 
minority holders, underscores that corporate norms exist for interests 
outside the signatories to the agreement. The corporation is not exclusively 
a privately-ordered arrangement.  
Statutes commonly enable company shareholders to tailor their 
arrangements within the corporate statute. In some states, corporations 
meeting statutory conditions that qualify them as “close corporations” can 
alter their governance structure, such as abolishing the board of directors 
or providing dissolution upon the request of any stockholder.
33
 Consent to 
 
 
 29. See generally 3 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 14.13 (3d ed. 2010).  
 30. 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964). 
 31. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 29, § 14.5. 
 32. Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 585. 
 33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350–51, 354 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 
(2007). 
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such arrangements occurs dually through a super-vote requirement 
introduced after the corporation has been formed and due notice of the 
deviation appearing on the share certificates.
34
 Even when the parties do 
not follow the prescribed procedure for opting out of discrete features of 
the general corporation law, the courts uphold their agreement by 
reasoning that the authorization is enabling and the statutory norm is not 
inflexible, particularly when no third party or public policy is adversely 
affected.
35
 However, what is authorized to be changed by such consent is 
the governance structure the parties have mutually chosen. In doing so, 
their consent is specific as to the particular change in the “default” rule 
provided by statute. 
The frequent resort in the close corporation setting to protecting 
“reasonable expectations” of shareholders36 falls short of reducing the 
corporation to a web of contracts. To be sure, the most enduring 
contribution of scholars who have written persuasively that close 
corporations should be conceptualized as incorporated partnerships is not 
the underused provisions some corporate statutes accord statutory close 
corporations,
37
 but their awakening courts to the unique vulnerabilities of 
close corporation shareholders. These are vulnerabilities of the type that 
call for equitable protection. The touchstone for judicial protection, 
whether in the form of monetary relief or ordering dissolution, is whether 
the majority has substantially defeated the reasonable expectations of the 
minority holder.
38
  
 
 
 34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 342–43 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(b) 
(2007). 
 35. See, e.g., Ramos v. Estrada, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 835–38 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a 
voting agreement among all shareholders was valid even though the company did not fulfill statutory 
requirements to be a statutory “close corporation,” and the statute authorized such an arrangement for 
“close corporations”); Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684–86 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that an agreement 
among parties expressly authorized for corporations qualifying as close corporations in Delaware is 
valid when there are no intervening third-party rights). 
 36. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of 
Changes, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717 (2002) 
(reviewing cases anchoring protections to minority holder in the minority holder’s reasonable 
expectations); Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 
699 (1993) (reviewing the role that reasonable expections play in granting relief under dissolution 
statutes). 
 37. See 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 1.29 (rev. 3d ed. 2015) (setting forth data reflecting that a tiny fraction of newly 
formed corporations opt into statutory close corporation regimes afforded by various states). 
 38. COX & HAZEN, supra note 29, §§ 14.13, .16. This approach is not without its interpretative 
problems. Reasonable and intelligent minds can easily disagree over the content of rules based on the 
probable reasonable expectations of business owners. This is classically illustrated in Jordan v. Duff & 
Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), where Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner 
reached conflicting positions regarding whether an at-will employment contract would allow the 
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Protecting “reasonable expectations” has the ring of contract law, so 
that we might conclude that, at least in the close corporation, contract and 
not governance is central because the protected interest arises from the 
“bargain.” But it is equally persuasive to conclude that in the close 
corporation setting corporate law and contract law reach the same 
conclusion regarding what is the optimal and just result. Nonetheless, 
where a fiduciary relationship exists, it exists not because of an agreement 
to be fiduciaries but because public policy considerations impart to the 
parties fiduciary-based rights and obligations. This truly transcends private 
ordering.
39
 Contract law to a limited extent has a fiduciary basis as well, 
albeit the demands of the duty are not as pervasive as we find in corporate 
law. Consider that “in every contract there is an implied covenant that 
neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or 
injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.”40 
For example, Professor Melvin Eisenberg reasons that just as UCC 
provision 2-302 embraces the doctrine of unfair surprise so that a 
contractual term that is inconspicuous or unclear is rendered unenforceable 
if a party should have known it could be used to violate another party’s 
fair expectation, so it is that courts protect known expectations in close 
corporations from being unfairly surprised.
41
 These rules may easily be 
divined from the parties’ probable expectations, but to do so suggests they 
are alterable by the parties’ agreements. Much like the unalterable implied 
covenant in contracts, the fiduciary duties of corporate organizations are 
not anchored in consent and therefore are not alterable. Thus, while 
sounding in contract, the close corporation cases that are built on 
 
 
employer to terminate an employee so that the corporation could then exercise its right to acquire the 
employee’s shares at their book value, when the company was on the threshold of being acquired at a 
significant premium. Both judges premised their conflicting outcomes on the bargain the parties would 
have struck, with Judge Easterbrook concluding their bargain would have included an implied 
fiduciary duty that would constrain the employer from terminating the employee and thereby 
confiscating the employee’s share of the expected acquisition premium. Id. at 431–43. Judge Posner 
believed the hypothetical bargain would not have included such a duty. Id. at 444–52. 
 39. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 879, 887 (“The terms of an express agreement are surely not irrelevant to the fiduciary 
obligation analysis, but once a court concludes that a particular relationship has a fiduciary character, 
the parties’ manifest intention does not control their obligations to each other as dispositively as it does 
under a contract analysis.”). 
 40. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933). 
 41. Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1464–65 (observing that it is nearly impossible in the close 
corporation setting “to assess adequately the future costs and benefits in a fluid long-term 
relationship”). Professor Eisenberg notes that the reticence of courts to enforce liquidation damages 
clauses flows from a similar concern, namely a contracting party’s likely inattention to the clause due 
to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of fully foreseeing the future consequences of a breach. Id. at 
1463–64.  
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understandings and reasonable expectations can, and likely should, be 
viewed more broadly as necessarily a component of the law of relations 
among co-owners. The protective feature finds force in the “bargained for” 
exchange rhetoric, but the efficacy flows instead from what law anchored 
deeply in public policy believed necessary to protect expectations so as to 
promote entrepreneurial activity.  
Meiselman v. Meiselman, a leading case that premised its order of 
dissolution on the petitioner’s reasonable expectations having been 
defeated, held that the guiding “reasonable expectations” are to be 
ascertained by examining the entire history and could be altered over time 
as the shareholders interact and conduct the affairs of the corporation.
42
 Of 
importance in this and other applications of the “reasonable expectations” 
approach is the element of mutuality. Expectations are those that are not 
just known but shared. With such awareness, the law’s protection against 
unfair surprise is justified. The role of such mutuality stands in stark 
contrast to the results reached in Boilermakers and ATP Tour, where the 
courts sanctioned resort to a generalized grant of authority to amend a 
document that historically does not address shareholder litigation to defeat 
existing substantive and procedural rules for shareholder litigation.
43
 Even 
though contract law protects against unfair surprise, the invocation of the 
contract analogy in Boilermakers and ATP Tour welcomes and legitimates 
the unexpected under the guise of contract law. 
The “reasonable expectations” rubric has lessons outside the close 
corporation setting. Because fiduciary duty law has developed through 
years of ex post application, its content is informed not solely by what 
cases have held before but importantly by the specific facts before the 
court, so that obligations and rights are shaped by the probable 
expectations of the parties. Fiduciary law efficiently relieves the parties of 
the burden of providing specification of duties or verification of 
performance.
44
 In the contract context, parties whose contract is 
incomplete expect they can fill in any gaps that may arise in the future via 
self-interested arms-length renegotiation; their conduct in such 
renegotiation is constrained only by the existing contractual duty of good 
 
 
 42. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) (“[S]hareholder’s ‘rights or 
interests’ in a close corporation include the ‘reasonable expectations’ the complaining shareholder has 
in the corporation.”). 
 43. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557–58 (Del. 2014); 
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–41 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 44. Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of 
Fiduciary Relationships, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 215 (Andrew S. Gold 
& Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). 
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faith and fair dealing.
45
 In contrast, if the relationship is a fiduciary one, 
the law demands that the fiduciary unilaterally adjust to the new 
circumstances in an “other-regarding way” consistent with duties of care 
and loyalty.
46
 Herein lies a fundamental distinction between judging the 
parties’ behavior through the contract lens versus the corporate law lens. 
Contracts and corporate law are not mirror images, as corporate law’s 
enshrinement of the inquiry causes the protection to be broader than that in 
contract law, where the protected expectations are derived from the four 
corners of the contract. Corporate law places an important governor on the 
directors, officers, and controlling stockholders to modify the relationship 
with owners.  
We can surmise that the ultimate contribution of the contract metaphor 
in corporate disputes is to frame, if not cabin, the inquiry whether 
shareholder rights exist. That is, nexus of contracts is more than a 
metaphor—it’s a rule of construction.47 More significantly yet, it is a rule 
of construction that, within a world of modern enabling corporate statutes, 
necessarily constrains shareholder rights and protections. In an 
environment where private ordering prevails, those in control—the board, 
officers, and controlling stockholders—enjoy important, and likely 
unerodible, strategic advantages.
48
 First, the informational advantages of 
those in control permit them not only to time a change to their own 
advantage, but also to understand better than outside shareholders the full 
effects of a bylaw change they propose. As a consequence, they can act 
opportunistically to pursue self-interested ends, the effects of which only 
they can be fully aware. Second, insiders acting to amend bylaws do not 
face the formidable collective action problem that outside shareholders 
incur in moving a bylaw through the approval process. While both boards 
and shareholders enjoy the right to amend the bylaws, the board being a 
cohesive body as a practical matter enjoys lower costs and uncertainty 
when choosing the bylaw course of action. This is certainly the case when 
the board acts unilaterally via a bylaw amendment, but also is true when it 
 
 
 45.  Id. at 218. 
 46. Id. at 218. Tautologically, Easterbrook and Fischel, while championing the nexus-of-
contracts perspective, nonetheless recognize that fiduciary law exists to address contractual 
incompleteness. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 425, 427 (1993).  
 47. See Kornhauser, supra note 26, at 1451. 
 48. See Lucian A Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682–87 
(2007) (collecting evidence on the paucity of contested proxy solicitations, from which he concludes 
that because proxy contests, whether to elect directors or oppose management proposals, occur 
infrequently, the vitality of the shareholder franchise to vote is easily overstated). 
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seeks the approval of the shareholders for the proposed action. Indeed, 
under corporate law, the board’s costs to act are borne by the corporation, 
whereas the shareholders’ cost to act, and most importantly to persuade 
fellow shareholders, is borne by the activist shareholder. Thirdly, the law 
tilts heavily against shareholders in American public companies having the 
right to alter the fundamental structure of the corporation; corporate 
statutes set forth the basic structure of the corporation subject to 
countervailing provisions in the articles of incorporation. Thus, if altering 
the default rule, whereby corporate affairs are managed by or under the 
direction of the board of directors, the preferred structure must appear in 
the articles of incorporation. In the United States, unlike in other countries, 
only the board of directors has the power to initiate amendments to the 
articles of incorporation. This feature of American corporate law not only 
reduces the shareholders to a reactive role in defining their governance 
structure, but also necessarily restricts the area that is a proper subject for 
shareholder action.  
The Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Employees Pension Plan
49
 further constrains the shareholders’ authority to 
amend the bylaws. CA, Inc. held that the shareholders’ authority to initiate 
an amendment of the bylaws was limited to matters that are “procedural 
[or] process-oriented,”50 so that a bylaw that would encroach upon the 
managerial authority of the board of directors would be inappropriate.
51
 
Because this construction was based on the call in the Delaware statute 
that “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed 
by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided . . . in [the] certificate of incorporation,”52 if 
shareholders had the authority to initiate an amendment of the articles of 
incorporation, shareholders would not be limited to process- or 
procedurally-oriented matters. Rather, they could initiate, as the board can 
initiate, a wide range of substantive alterations to the conduct of the 
corporation’s affairs. Since shareholders lack authority in the very area 
that the board enjoys authority, the shareholders’ prerogative to initiate is 
greatly constrained within a private-ordering environment. Questions 
regarding the authority to change or opt out of a default rule will therefore 
be found when it is the board acting to change the rules of the game rather 
 
 
 49. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
 50. Id. at 235. 
 51. See id. at 235–37. 
 52. Id. at 232 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)). 
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than the shareholders. It is for this reason that the nexus-of-contracts 
rubric necessarily threatens shareholder rights and protection. 
Further evidence of the uneven balance between the prerogatives of the 
board of directors to act and the shareholders to alter the rules of 
governance is once again reflected in CA, Inc. Even though the bylaw 
involved was deemed to be process- and procedurally-oriented, and thus a 
proper subject for shareholder action, the court nonetheless held that the 
proposed bylaw was sufficiently general so that it could require 
reimbursement in instances that would be inconsistent with the board’s 
fiduciary obligations.
53
 The bylaw proposed in CA, Inc. provided that non-
management nominees who are elected to the board should be reimbursed 
for reasonable expenses incurred in their successful contests for office.
54
 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that because the bylaw could be 
invoked by a candidate who sought office solely to advance personal, 
rather than corporate, interests, the bylaw was invalid.
55
 In contrast to CA, 
Inc., when in Boilermakers challengers to the board-adopted forum-
selection bylaw raised multiple examples where the bylaw could be 
harmful to the corporation, Chancellor Strine summarily dismissed that 
line of challenge on the ground that “it would be imprudent and 
inappropriate to address these hypotheticals in the absence of a genuine 
controversy with concrete facts.”56 We are left, therefore, with the stark 
conclusion that shareholder- and board-initiated bylaws do not stand on 
the same footing, so that the efforts of the former are, despite satisfying a 
generic inquiry with respect to the subject of the bylaw being a proper one, 
also subject to ex ante scrutiny for their potential inconsistencies with 
corporate law, whereas the latter bylaws escape such ex ante scrutiny.
57
  
A final basis on which to question the contract paradigm in the 
corporate setting is how contract law and corporate law proceed on very 
 
 
 53. Id. at 233–37. 
 54. Id. at 229–30. 
 55. Id. at 238–40. 
 56. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 940 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 57. We might believe that the contrasting approaches between CA, Inc. and Boilermakers is 
symptomatic of a larger problem with the architecture of corporate law, namely that the role and 
prerogatives of the board of directors is believed to be more clearly defined than the role and 
prerogatives of shareholders. See generally Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the 
Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407 (2006). Because corporate statutes are areas where the 
shareholders enjoy protected rights that are defined with a good deal of precision, it would appear the 
problem is not a lack of precision, but rather too much precision. This permits the broadly-stated 
authority of the board to enjoy unrestrained deference, whereas the precise definition of the 
shareholders’ rights has led the courts, erroneously, to not accord similar deference to shareholder 
rights when mediating conflicts between the broad grant of authority to the board and more selective 
grants to the shareholders.  
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different bases for expected behavior on the part of the parties. The nexus-
of-contracts approach meshes poorly with corporate law in light of the 
very different assumptions that surround contracting parties versus the 
norm corporate law imposes on managers and dominant stockholders. 
Under bedrock corporate law, directors and officers are to act selflessly 
when discharging their corporate duties; in contrast, contracting parties 
pursue wealth maximization through self-interested, individualistic 
behavior.
58
 Whereas directors owe the corporation and owners a duty of 
loyalty, contracting parties pursue rugged self-interest, with the only 
governor being the obligations of good faith and fair dealing within the 
four corners of their contract. It is not possible to fit the contractual 
paradigm of individual pursuit of gain with the corporate law, where 
fiduciary obligations police discretionary behavior by managers and 
controlling stockholders. Principles and perspectives in the rugged 
contract setting simply do not survive in the relational setting of corporate 
law. 
II. WHAT’S IN A CONTRACT? 
As seen, Delaware courts embrace the board’s authority to alter 
substantive rights, at least those related to shareholder litigation, by 
unilateral amendment of the company’s bylaws. Delaware reaches this 
result on the premise that the shareholders stand in a contractual relation to 
the corporation. The power of this assertion flows from the assertion that 
the shareholders have consented to the board’s unilateral amendment of 
the shareholder right, power, or privilege, as well as the Delaware courts’ 
dignifying the approach by the assertion that the result is consistent with 
the law governing contracts. This section questions the overriding premise 
that contract law supports the conclusions reached in Delaware. Without 
this support, as is concluded here, the unilateral alteration of shareholder 
rights embraced in Boilermakers and ATP Tour lacks a legal foundation. 
Contract principles occupy a prominent, but well-defined, space in 
corporate law. The rhetoric of contract law occupies a broader area. The 
former is a sensible approach to resolving disputes between the 
corporation and debt-like claimants; the latter is an expedient form of 
analysis to resolve essentially a matter of internal housekeeping. To 
understand the divide, consider that Delaware courts have long recognized 
that the rights of senior claimants, such as bond holders and preferred 
 
 
 58. Coffee, supra note 11, at 1658.  
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shareholders, are exclusively contractual. For example, the rights of the 
corporation representing the interests of the common stockholders to 
change the accrued dividends of the preferred holders is determined from 
the preferred rights, privileges, and preferences as set forth in the articles 
of incorporation.
59
 Similarly, in Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc.,
60
 
the court upheld the lower court’s ruling that a conversion of preferred 
stock into common stock was not a liquidation event that, under the 
corporation’s charter, would trigger the preferred shareholders’ contractual 
entitlement to a liquidation preference payment. The court noted that 
“unless there is ambiguity, Delaware courts interpret contract terms 
according to their plain, ordinary meaning,” whereupon it held that the 
conversion in question did not meet the plain meaning requirements of the 
corporate charter provision that defined what constituted a liquidation 
event.
61
 Charter terms, therefore, were seen as contracts with the preferred 
holders so that the preferred holders’ rights were determined from that 
instrument’s four corners, and there was no application of fiduciary or 
equitable notions extraneous to the charter. Bondholders’ claims 
sometimes are also contractual, with slight departure from the rigidity of 
contract law occurring in isolated instances in which courts accord 
bondholders non-expressed protection via an implied covenant of fair 
dealing, a concept of corporate law that flows from a fair construction of 
the debenture itself.
62
 The contractual approach in this setting is easily 
understood to flow from the nature of the bondholder or preferred 
shareholder’s relationship to the corporation, which at its core is not 
simply that of being a provider of capital but doing so with no greater 
expectation than that the relationship is adversarial. Thus, self-help in the 
form of contracting, not paternalism, is the guidepost for such senior 
claimants.  
To be sure, contract-like approaches in terms of interpreting 
understandings reached within the business are common to resolving 
disputes raised by residual claimants who, unlike senior claimants, do 
enjoy the protections of fiduciary obligations on the part of managers and 
dominant stockholders. For example, in Centaur Partners, IV v. National 
Intergroup, Inc., the articles mandated a classified board, authorized the 
 
 
 59. See, e.g., Ellingwood v. Wolf’s Head Oil Refining Co., Inc., 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del. 1944) 
(stating that in resolving the power to alter the preferred accumulated dividends, “the rights of 
stockholders are contract rights and . . . it is necessary to look to the certificate of incorporation to 
ascertain what those rights are”).  
 60. 41 A.3d 381, 385–91 (Del. 2012). 
 61. Id. at 385–86. 
 62. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 878–81 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
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board to establish its own size, and provided that a provision of the articles 
or bylaws dealing with related matters could be amended only with an 
affirmative 80 percent vote of the stockholders.
63
 The Court, in deciding 
whether a majority or 80 percent vote was required to expand the board 
from nine to fifteen, did so by invoking “general rules of contract 
interpretation.”64 Centaur Partners’ use of a contract-like approach does 
not transform the bylaws, or for that matter the supporting articles of 
incorporation, into a contract. The approach used was little more than a 
sensible tool to determine what the organic governance documents 
required. Nonetheless, what underscores each of the above illustrations is 
the necessity of definiteness in resolving the dispute. That is, each dispute 
rested upon the underlying documents’ being clear and unambiguous with 
respect to the rights of the parties. Contractual interpretation of documents 
that arose within a corporation from which the parties’ rights and duties 
are embodied is not equivalent to the corporation itself being a contract or 
being solely made up of contractual relationships. 
Beyond the above highly specific contexts in which contracts impact 
parties within a corporate setting is the propriety of concluding that such 
individual contracts are overall an endless and intricate web that renders 
the entire enterprise a contract. A close analysis of contract law rejects this 
conclusion. 
The great contracts scholar, Allan Farnsworth, states that there are two 
overarching considerations in determining whether a contract exists: did 
both parties assent to be bound, and is their agreement definitive?
65
 As 
will be seen, the latter is a prerequisite for the former. The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts also couples both these requirements by providing 
that “[e]ven though a manifestation of intention is intended to be 
understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract 
unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.”66 The requirement 
of definiteness is essential, as it goes to the central objective of the 
contract to protect the expectations of the parties when they exchanged 
promises in forming the contract.
67
 Should there be an alleged breach of 
 
 
 63. Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 925–26 (Del. 1990). 
 64. Id. at 928. 
 65. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981). For sales of goods, definiteness is 
addressed in U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2002), where we might consider there is somewhat more flexibility to 
be found in the statement that an agreement fails for indefiniteness when it does not provide “a 
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.” 
 67. Consider that the very nature of a contract is “a promise or set of promises for breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.” 
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performance promised by a party, the courts must “determine . . . with 
some precision” the scope of the promised consideration.68 And all the 
greater is the need for specificity when the relief sought for an alleged 
breach is specific performance.
69
 Definiteness has a further role in 
deciding whether there is a contract. The more terms and conditions the 
parties have omitted from their agreement, the less likely it is that they in 
fact intended to enter into an enforceable agreement.
70
 Thus, definiteness 
bears directly on whether there was an intent to contract. Finally, 
indefiniteness removes the promise from being consideration to support 
another’s enforceable obligation. That is, a promise that as a practical 
matter is too indefinite to be enforced cannot be sufficient consideration 
for a counter-promise.
71
  
To be sure, contract law does contemplate that the parties to a contract 
cannot provide for every potential occurrence or event; and, as a practical 
matter, it can be that not all terms can be set forth at the moment of 
contracting. Some matters at the moment of contracting may be 
impractical to specify in the agreement, such as price or quantity in the 
case of a sale of goods. Thus, it has become an accepted practice, endorsed 
by the UCC, for courts to fill in certain contractual gaps.
72
 Nevertheless, 
any such gap filling must occur through a predictable means whereby the 
information that was intentionally omitted can be ascertained.
73
 The 
 
 
1 SAMUEL A. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2015). Thus, absent 
clarity with respect to performance, it is not possible for the arrangement to be enforceable or to be 
expected to be enforceable, so that any exchange of promises would be illusory. See 1 ARTHUR 
LINTON CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., LexisNexis rev. ed. 1993) 
(noting that vagueness, indefiniteness, and uncertainty as to the terms of an agreement prevent the 
creation of an enforceable contract). 
 68. FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 3.1. In effect, the definiteness requirement is a “necessary 
limitation on freedom of contract” because a court must be capable of identifying the terms of 
agreement between the parties before determining if either party has breached it. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.9 (5th ed. 2003). 
 69. FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 3.1; see also, e.g., Carr v. Duval, 39 U.S. 77, 83 (1840) 
(denying request for specific performance on a contract to sell land because agreement was not 
sufficiently certain for the court to decree with some exactness whether the relief sought was 
appropriate). 
 70. PERILLO, supra note 68, § 2.9. 
 71. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 67, § 4.32. From time to time courts enforce indefinite contracts 
where performance has begun and commenced to a state that removes the uncertainty. See, e.g., Cont’l 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Am. Bonding Co., 605 F.2d 1049, 1054 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that construction 
contract was sufficiently definite as a consequence of partial performance by the contractor). 
 72. See, e.g., Neuhoff v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co., 370 F.3d 197, 203–04 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(noting that it is not required that all terms of an agreement be precisely specified, and that the 
presence of undefined or unspecified terms will not necessarily preclude the formation of a binding 
contract); 1 WILLISTON, supra note 67, § 4.21. 
 73. 1 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 4.1; see also generally Nellie Eunsoo Choi, Note, Contracts with 
Open or Missing Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: A Proposal for 
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classic illustration of this is the so-called requirements contracts, in which 
quantity or price is not firmly set forth. But with such contracts there is a 
requirement that the agreement provides “a reasonably certain basis for 
giving an appropriate remedy.”74 For example, price can be omitted when 
it is to be a “reasonable price at the time of delivery.”75 Furthermore, the 
UCC addresses uncertainty with respect to the quantity of goods covered 
by the requirements contract by conditioning their validity on there being a 
stated estimate for volume or what is normal or otherwise comparative 
output or requirements of the party, as well as imposing a broad duty of 
good faith on the parties. These steps are what prevents the undertaking 
from being illusory.
76
 Of interest for the purpose of this Article is that 
outside the sale-of-goods context, courts regularly take a less flexible 
approach to address indefiniteness within the agreement,
77
 limiting any 
gap filling to immaterial terms of the agreement.
78
 That is, courts are less 
likely to find a contract when a material term is not specified outside the 
sale-of-goods context.  
Corporate law also responds to overreaching in requirements contracts. 
In a classic corporate law case, Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric 
 
 
Unification, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (2003) (reviewing how the UCC and courts embrace “gap fillers” 
and “default rules” to address indefiniteness in specific areas such as price, place of delivery, and time 
of delivery). 
 74. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2002). Courts have, however, been reluctant to extend this approach 
outside the sale of goods. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, at 211 (emphasizing this point by way of 
limiting the scope of requirements contracts by courts being unwilling to extend the approach to rental 
contracts). 
 75. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2002). The code therefore provides an objectively identifiable external 
standard for performance. A similar approach is embraced for the timing of performance via the 
“within a reasonable time” standard. See id. § 2-309(1); cf. Seinfeld v. Slager, Civil Action No. 6462-
VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *10–14 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012) (holding that because the Stock 
Incentive Plan failed to include objective standards for allocating grants and instead left grants to the 
discretion of the board of directors, the shareholder approval of the plan and the terms of the plan itself 
could not insulate the directors from a suit alleging self-interested behavior in granting options to 
themselves). 
 76. FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, at 83–84; see also generally John C. Weistart, Requirements 
and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the UCC, 1973 DUKE L.J. 599 (providing a 
comprehensive examination of pre-UCC case law as guidance for the meaning and importance of 
“good faith” in addressing open-ended quantity in commercial requirements and output contracts). 
 77. Choi, supra note 73, at 52. 
 78. Among the terms deemed material are payment terms, specific price, duration of agreement, 
and quality of work. PERILLO, supra note 68, § 2.9; see also Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 670 P.2d 
51, 53 (Idaho 1983) (emphasis omitted) (“A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its 
material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty.”); 
Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1643–
44 (2003) (noting that the requirement of definiteness is well entrenched in the case law and a basis for 
dismissing alleged breach-of-contract claims). 
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Co.,
79
 Judge Cardozo held the director’s duty of loyalty was breached by 
the director, Maynard, remaining silent and not warning his fellow 
directors that a contract the board had approved required the utility to 
provide at a fixed cost all the power needs of the mill regardless of the 
customer’s usage.80 The evidence indicated that after the contract was 
entered into, the customer, who was controlled by Maynard, substantially 
changed its operations so that significantly greater electricity was to be 
supplied by the power company than was the customary usage during the 
period leading up to the requirements contract being formed.
81
 The law of 
contracts and Globe Woolen Co. each reject the notion that directors can 
exploit open-ended authority so as to materially affect the other party. This 
conclusion is directly contradictory to the notion that the board has 
authority to act unilaterally through the bylaws to complete earlier 
unspecified material matters.
82
  
As seen, in appropriate instances, courts complete contracts in 
important and necessary ways by supplying missing terms by 
implication.
83
 However, implication does not erode the importance of 
definiteness for a contract to exist. Courts act to supply the implied term 
only when persuaded that “the language of the agreement does not cover 
the case at hand,” and that the implied term is in furtherance of a definitive 
promise of performance.
84
 Thus, contract law does not permit the 
requirement of definiteness, even in the instance of a requirements 
contract, to be satisfied through the fiat of the well-understood implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists in all contracts.
85
 
Application of this implied covenant must occur within the agreement so 
that what is implied is guided by a definite subject matter, and therefore 
the implied covenant cannot itself be the means to redeem what would 
 
 
 79. 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918). 
 80. Id. at 380. 
 81. Id. at 379. 
 82. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 1573–78 (reasoning that if such shareholder-focused 
protections are to be altered, they should occur in the initial charter so that they can be both “frozen” 
and initially priced); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: 
The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1829, 1837 (1989) 
(concluding that private ordering should not occur via amendments to the charter as, unlike private 
ordering in the initial charter, they cannot be priced efficiently). 
 83. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 84. FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, § 7.16. 
 85. Despite the broad recognition of the existence of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, in practice this is an underenforced norm. See Paul MacMahon, Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
as an Underenforced Legal Norm, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2051, 2052 (2015). A similar complaint is made 
of fiduciary duties in corporate law. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 522 (2012).  
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otherwise be open-ended authority for one of the parties to act.
86
 Thus, we 
find that courts, sometimes invoking public policy concerns, deem an 
agreement unenforceable because of indefiniteness where it reserves to 
either party “a future unbridled right to determine the nature of . . . 
performance.”87 Moreover, the context in which the implied covenant 
operates is important. In a purely contractual setting, good faith does not 
proscribe self-interested behavior.
88
 But in the corporate context, as 
discussed earlier, when that conduct is carried out by one deemed a 
fiduciary, not only is self-interested behavior proscribed, but the burden of 
proof is also on the fiduciary to establish fairness.
89
  
Furthermore, it is not possible to address the open-endedness of the 
shareholder “contract” with the corporation and its board of directors by 
the fiat of relying on income or wealth maximization to provide the 
necessary definiteness that will illuminate the path by which obligations 
and rights are determined. If the parties’ intent is the ultimate focus, as it is 
in contract law, income or wealth maximization is simply too incomplete 
in itself to guide any determination of the parties’ probable intention.90 
Certainly this conclusion is the case in the context of the corporate 
organization, where procedures, such as the periodic election of directors, 
form the mechanism for accountability. Any argument that the relationship 
among directors, officers, and shareholders is guided by the contract set 
forth in, for example, the bylaws, is overcome by the multiple features of 
corporate statutes that provide the means for change, accountability, and 
discipline through governance mechanisms, not the terms of an 
“agreement.”   
III. CORPORATE LAW IS PUBLIC, NOT PRIVATE, LAW 
As developed above, there are multiple bases for disagreeing with the 
nexus-of-contracts view of the corporation. The focus in this section is to 
take issue with the foundational belief held by the nexus-of-contracts 
 
 
 86. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 65, §§ 7.16, .17. 
 87. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 67, § 4:21; see 29 WILLISTON, supra note 67, § 74:16; see, e.g., 
Lahaina-Maui Corp. v. Tau Tet Hew, 362 F.2d 419, 425 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that the 
subordination provision that gave the lessee an option to encumber the lessor’s property with lien, 
indefinite in amount, to secure loan(s) with an unspecified rate of interest, term, and manner of 
payment, without further specifying uses to which the loan proceeds could be directed, was not 
enforceable).  
 88. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 89. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 900. 
 90. Kornhauser, supra note 26, at 1452–53. 
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school that corporate law is so private that it is subject to wholesale private 
ordering.
91
 It is the view that corporate law is solely private, with 
corporate statutes merely filling in the blanks, that empowers decisions, 
such as Boilermakers and ATP Tour, holding that rights once held by an 
owner can be altered as the managers may agree.
92
 In contrast to this view, 
if corporate law is understood as significantly public law and not private 
law, the ticklish questions of consent among the parties allegedly involved 
in the “contracting” process need not be addressed. That is, if corporate 
law is understood to enjoy substantial public features, then at least our 
assumptions should change regarding the board of directors’ authority to 
unilaterally change such public norms. Hence, the question of consent, or 
power to impose on another a requirement, need only be addressed if a 
matter is one deemed of solely private contract-like arrangements. The 
threshold question therefore is what areas of corporate law are beyond the 
reach of the board of directors? 
Corporations are unlike partnerships. Corporations do not arise solely 
by consent. A corporate entity requires completing at least a few modest 
formalities for its creation. Such formalism is required for all entities that 
seek limited liability for their owners. Limited liability is clearly a private 
benefit to the owners enjoying this status. Limited liability, however, does 
much more, as it produces public benefits including stimulating 
 
 
 91. The public-private law distinction used in this Article is admittedly an overstatement of the 
contract law-corporate law divide. Contract law facilitates private ordering so that within fairly broad 
rules the parties can enter into private arrangements that impose mutual obligations and benefits. As 
used here, public law embodies rules that exist to serve societal objectives that transcend individual 
actors. A commercial example of public law includes the numerous conditions of the US securities 
laws for which Congress has expressly provided that the terms cannot be waived. See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77n, 78cc (2014). The rules exist to, among other things, stimulate economic growth and facilitate 
the efficient allocation of resources. The greater good served by these twin objectives underlies the 
anti-waiver provisions of the securities laws. To be sure, contract law does embrace a set of rules for 
there to be an enforceable obligation so that their existence also can be seen as public law. For 
example, as discussed above, the requirement of definiteness of consideration must be satisfied for 
there to be an enforceable obligation. Contract law undoubtedly produces a public good in terms of 
economic stability and economic growth. Thus, to label contract law as private law is admittedly not 
precise but provides a basis to frame the following: there are features of contract law that cannot be 
altered by the parties’ agreement. As developed in this Article, the requirement of definiteness is not a 
matter that the parties can waive if they are to have a contract. Indeed, it is tautological to argue that 
the parties can agree to an indefinite level of performance, since there cannot be an agreement if 
parties do not know to what they have agreed. Hence, the use of “public law” in contradistinction to 
“private law” refers to features of a body of law, in this case corporate law, that have such strong 
societal benefits that they are beyond private ordering, just as some elements of contract law, such as 
the requirement of definiteness, cannot be waived. Thus, private ordering can definitely occur within 
the corporation; but, as argued here, there are multiple features of corporate law, many more than exist 
in contract law, that are beyond private ordering.  
 92. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557–58 (Del. 2014); 
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–41 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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entrepreneurial activity and commerce generally. These public benefits are 
thus subsidized by limited liability. To be sure, the tangible burdens of this 
subsidy are provided not by the state, but by creditors who accept the risk 
that their claims may not be fully satisfied. Nonetheless, it is the state that 
sets the default rule of limited liability. Another subsidy the state provides 
is the friction it introduces into dissolving the entity. Corporations are not 
nearly as fragile as partnerships, whether or not at will. This produces the 
public benefit of facilitating capital formation, as friction in the path of 
withdrawing capital is favorably regarded by those who wish to see 
stability within the firm, so that capital raised can be devoted to the causes 
represented to investors by the firm’s promoters.93 
Moreover, legislatures have enacted restrictions on corporations’ 
powers to make distributions to their owners.
94
 These limitations form a 
bulwark against the erosion of interests creditors have in the corporation’s 
assets that otherwise could be subverted through distributions to owners in 
the form of dividends or share repurchases. To be sure, creditors can 
negotiate additional protections, but the costs of so doing may exceed the 
expected benefits. Furthermore, small creditors may not find one-off 
negotiations efficient. For at least this group of creditors, the minimum 
protection provided by the statute provides a first line of defense. Such 
creditor protection is public law, as it encourages credit to be extended and 
priced with a view toward promoting economic activity. Similarly 
consistent with the public nature of corporate law is how courts weigh the 
interests of non-shareholders when considering whether to bend the 
traditional corporate rules. For example, in considering whether to 
disregard the direct-derivative distinction for a shareholder suit in the close 
corporation, the absence of harm to creditors is an important consideration 
in allowing a minority holder to maintain as a direct action a suit that 
customarily must be brought on behalf of the corporation as a derivative 
suit.
95
 
Similarly, fiduciary obligations, some anchored in corporate statutes 
and most developed at common law, protect the interests of shareholders 
from harmful overreaching and sometimes the directors’ or officers’ 
ineptitude. The norms that flow from litigation’s enforcing fiduciary 
standards strengthen sensible management of firms and thus contribute to 
 
 
 93. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387, 389 (2003). 
 94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 170 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (2007). 
 95. See, e.g., Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1995) (following § 7.01 of the ALI’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance). 
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increased economic activity. The norms themselves shape best practices 
and in that way reduce agency costs as well as uncertainty. Each in turn 
yields a public benefit. Fiduciary duties, therefore, are hardly private, as 
they yield important externalities—their enforcement not only 
compensates those injured by misconduct, but also promotes investment 
by establishing investor-friendly norms to which managers must conform. 
In their absence, investors would demand a higher return, thus raising the 
cost of capital across the board, as firm managers and controlling 
stockholders may be unable to signal effectively, and never costlessly, 
their lower propensity to misbehave.
96
 Thus, enforceable fiduciary duties 
fill this gap and serve the public interest by lowering the cost of capital. 
Note here as well that the weakening enforcement of these norms 
necessarily weakens the norms themselves and erodes their public benefit.  
Consider that shares may be subject to private arrangements restricting 
their transfer; this would suggest only private ordering. But private 
ordering has no impact on a transferee without knowledge of the 
restriction. Since the transferee of shares is not within the “web” of the 
corporation, it is not possible to see the law on this subject as purely 
private. The provision protecting transferees therefore has a distinctly 
public orientation of protecting third-party interests and thus facilitating 
the aggregation of capital (if the law were otherwise, purchasers of shares 
would do so with a healthy respect for the chance that a hidden restriction 
deprives the transferee of the rights to ownership).  
We therefore see there are many features of corporate law where the 
interests protected are by their nature beyond the scope of private ordering 
short of meaningful consent by the affected parties.
97
 Modern limited 
liability company (“LLC”) statutes stand in sharp contrast to the heavy 
public orientation of corporate statutes. As is well understood, the LLC is 
of fairly recent origin and founded on a desire to blend the favorable 
taxation feature of the partnership with the overarching corporate benefit 
of limited liability. The history of the LLC was shaped in the shadow of 
 
 
 96. See generally James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 
(1999) (reviewing how fiduciary obligations, and their enforcement, establish valuable social norms). 
 97. This point can be seen as reinforced by the express feature of corporate statutes authorizing 
in selected areas the approval of a majority of the shares to bind the minority. Absent express authority 
for the majority to act, the rights could not be affected. The once-rigid “vested rights” approach that 
froze all shareholders into a position supported by the minority was discarded early in the life of the 
corporation so as to facilitate commerce. But the authority of the majority to affect the interest of the 
minority is conditioned not only on there being clear authority to introduce the change, but importantly 
on the ex post inquiry into fair treatment, and in some instances the appraisal remedy supplanted the 
rigidity of contract as the means of protecting a disgruntled minority. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 
1635. 
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the US Supreme Court’s Morrissey tests for determining when an entity 
would not be deemed a corporation, thereby enabling it to enjoy non-
taxpaying status.
98
 Per Morrissey, the route for such a favorable revenue 
ruling was that the entity had more partnership than corporate features.
99
 
Since the common objective behind each such partnership feature was 
consent akin to that found in a contract, the LLC morphed along the lines 
of private ordering driven by consent of the LLC’s members. Even though 
US tax authorities now embrace a more favorable “check-the-box” 
approach,
100
 so that Morrissey today is a historic milepost, the legacy of 
the earlier treatment of LLCs remains: LLCs historically sought to avoid 
being a taxable entity by exuding private-ordering arrangements 
customary in partnerships. Thus, the hallmark of today’s LLC statutes 
continues to be a full embrace of private ordering on a scale well beyond 
that found in general corporation statutes. For example, the Delaware 
Limited Liability Company Act provides: “It is the policy of this chapter 
to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to 
the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”101 General 
corporate statutes, even in Delaware, lack any parallel to this provision.  
The juxtaposition of LLC statutes with general corporation statutes not 
only invites but also confirms the conclusion that a clear distinction exists 
between the two with respect to the embrace of private ordering.
102
 
Whereas the LLC enjoys few private-ordering restrictions, corporate law 
provides a body of predictable mandatory rules and no open-ended 
invitation for their alteration. While less freedom for private ordering 
exists within the corporate statute, corporate statutes’ greater rigidity 
through more standardized terms has social significance by reducing 
information costs for market participants as well as reducing legal 
 
 
 98. See Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344, 354–59 (1935) (setting forth six factors to be 
considered in deciding whether an association is to be taxable as a corporation, such that an association 
that has more corporate than partnership attributes among the six factors would be a taxable entity). 
 99. See id. 
 100. In 1997, the US Internal Revenue Service replaced the Morrissey test by granting non-
incorporated entities the freedom to elect whether to be treated for taxation purposes as a corporation 
or a partnership. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (2015) (finalizing simplified entity classification 
rules). 
 101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2015). 
 102. For the view that private ordering in LLCs is not the product of negotiations between 
promoters and investors and that the free-writing in delineating or eliminating fiduciary duties that 
commonly occurs within the operating agreement is a poor substitute for what can be accomplished 
within the corporate context, see Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited 
Contractual Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015). 
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uncertainty.
103
 At a minimum, the distinction between the two bodies 
should caution against applying a contractual paradigm to corporate 
matters.    
IV. LESSONS FROM THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP 
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.
104
 bears significantly on the 
disconnection between the nexus-of-contracts paradigm and the 
corporation and shines a light on a core feature of corporate law: the 
division of authority between the board and the shareholders. Upon 
learning that a substantial blockholder was soliciting shareholders for their 
consent that would expand the board from seven to fifteen and thereupon 
appoint eight nominees to Atlas’s board who would support a proposed 
restructuring of Atlas, the Atlas board moved swiftly to thwart a potential 
shift in control.
105
 The Atlas board filled two of the board seats so that 
Blasius Industries could not quickly wrest control of Atlas.
106
 Chancellor 
Allen, even though holding that the Atlas board acted in good faith in 
defending control, nonetheless held that the board’s actions were beyond 
the protection of the business judgment rule.
107
 He reached this conclusion 
by observing that the board’s actions were not solely steps taken to 
manage the company, but instead were acts that impacted the relationship 
between principal and agent “with respect to a matter of internal corporate 
governance.”108 To so act, he believed the board needed to make a stronger 
case than merely that it had acted in good faith when its decision thwarted 
the shareholders’ franchise. He therefore required the board to establish a 
compelling justification for interdicting the shareholder franchise to elect 
or nominate directors.
109
 Significantly, the justification that must be 
advanced by the board is not a purpose narrowly focused on whether the 
corporate interest is advanced by management’s unilateral interdiction; 
the compelling justification that is required must be anchored by how, 
 
 
 103. Coffee, supra note 11, at 1678. 
 104. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 105. Id. at 654–55. 
 106. Id. Because the Atlas Board was classified, with directors serving staggered three-year terms, 
id. at 655, the consequence of filling two seats was that it would require two annual meetings for 
Blasius to have any chance to wrest a majority of the board seats. 
 107. Id. at 663. 
 108. Id. at 660. 
 109. Id. at 659–63. 
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under the circumstances, the board’s action furthers the shareholders’ 
franchise.
110
 Allen reasoned: 
A board’s decision to act to prevent the shareholders from creating a 
majority of new board positions and filling them does not involve 
the exercise of the corporation’s power over its property, or with 
respect to its rights or obligations; rather, it involves allocation, 
between shareholders as a class and the board, of effective power 
with respect to governance of the corporation. . . . Action designed 
principally to interfere with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably 
involves a conflict between the board and a shareholder majority. 
Judicial review of such action involves a determination of the legal 
and equitable obligations of an agent towards his principal. This is 
not, in my opinion, a question that a court may leave to the agent 
finally to decide so long as he does so honestly and competently; 
that is, it may not be left to the agent’s business judgment.111   
To be noted as well is that Blasius’ protection of shareholder franchise 
arises even though the board is acting in a way that is the exercise of 
corporate powers; a corporate purpose existed in Blasius—to continue the 
ongoing business plan—but a legitimate corporate purpose was not by 
itself sufficient to justify the board’s actions that had the correlative effect 
of impacting the franchise of shareholders.
112
 This observation flows from 
Chancellor Allen’s holding that the board had acted consistently with its 
obligations to defend the corporation from a threatened change in the 
board’s ongoing business policy.113 
Blasius adheres to the wise advice that “agents whose interests may 
materially diverge from the interests of their principals should not have the 
power to unilaterally determine or materially vary the rules that govern 
those divergencies of interests.”114 That is, in the principal-agent realm, the 
 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 660. 
 112. Id. at 658–63. 
 113. Id. 
 114. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1474; see also Bebchuk, supra note 48, at 709–10 (“[I]t is 
necessary to constrain board-adopted election bylaws that opt out of the provided default arrangement 
to make it more difficult to replace incumbent directors.”). Professor Bebchuk suggests a change in 
such a default rule be conditioned on the bylaw being approved by the shareholders. Bebchuk, supra 
note 48, at 709–11. He offers as support that the Delaware legislature has set the model for this 
approach by permitting the bylaws adopted after shares have been issued to classify the board only if 
the bylaw has been approved by the shareholders. Id. at 710; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) 
(2015). A higher level of approval is also required to provide directors immunity from damages, where 
such a shield must appear in the articles of incorporation so that the shield, if adopted after shares have 
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relationship and the methods for selecting and controlling the agent are 
defined by the principal and not the agent. To this end, and as Blasius 
illustrates, managerial actions that impact the owners’ ability to pursue the 
limited powers owners have to discipline managers—sell, suffrage, or 
sue—are not just of a different order of magnitude; they are within an 
entirely different sphere of corporate law, that of governance. Because 
they are not within the board’s managerial sphere, they are to be judged by 
a very different standard than applies to questions of management’s 
stewardship of the firm’s business. This conclusion, as well as Blasius’ 
holding, flows naturally from the fact that corporate statutes, while 
broadly enabling of the board of directors, nonetheless restrict the board’s 
powers to matters of the corporation and to the limited areas of the 
shareholders’ franchise. Under today’s statutes, the board’s—and hence its 
appointees’—authority with respect to the firm’s operations is clearly set 
forth in the command that “all corporate powers shall be exercised by or 
under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the 
business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the 
direction” of the board of directors.115 Simply stated, a general grant of 
authority to the board of directors to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws is a 
weak basis for concluding such authority extends to altering the rights or 
protections shareholders customarily enjoy. 
Because corporate statutes typically impose no limit on the content of 
bylaws except that a bylaw not conflict with the corporate statute or the 
company’s charter, the content of bylaws is open ended.116 Therefore, 
bylaws typically and appropriately address a wide range of matters, from 
internal operations (e.g., description of authority of officers) to functioning 
of the board (e.g., notice and quorum for meetings) to shareholder-related 
matters such as notice and procedures for meetings. The board 
unquestionably has authority to act in these areas, but its authority is not 
the same across all areas. The thesis of this Article is that the board’s 
authority to act within areas peculiar to the shareholder franchise cannot 
 
 
been issued, requires amendment with the approval of the stockholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (2015). 
 115. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007) (emphasis added); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 141(a) (2015) (emphasis added) (“The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”). 
 116. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, 
not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its 
stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 601(b) (McKinney 2015); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06(b) (2007). 
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be premised on its authority to act on contract. In proceeding on the basis 
that the shareholders’ relationship is contractual and therefore amenable to 
unilateral change, the courts have failed to mediate the conflicting interests 
and allied rights that distinguish owners from managers. Therefore, the 
nexus-of-contracts notion that the board has wide-ranging authority to 
alter the shareholder relation to the board therefore is not only at odds with 
Blasius but also ignores the distinctions corporate law makes with respect 
to institutional prerogatives of the board and those of the shareholders, 
and, more fundamentally, why they are not mirror images of one another. 
Each has a sphere of authority and a related sphere of protection from the 
other’s encroachment.117  
There is an even stronger and broader message behind Blasius: there 
needs to be recognized among corporate law certain mandatory 
prophylactic rules whose existence and enforcement are understood as 
necessary to prevent opportunistic insider behavior. And this bundle of 
rules is beyond private ordering except pursuant to the most scrupulous 
attention to consent’s being granted. As in Blasius, an escape from such 
rules’ protections or requirements must be zealously protected, perhaps by 
the “compelling justification” standard invoked by Chancellor Allen.118 
Minimally, there should be a strong presumption that the rules establish a 
sacred space for shareholders that can rarely be entered by the board.  
V. FINDING THE SHAREHOLDERS’ FRANCHISE 
Blasius and the provisions in corporate statutes that bestow authority 
on the board support an approach toward defining the board’s authority 
that recognizes that the authority, and hence deference the board enjoys 
with respect to stewardship of the corporation’s business, do not apply to 
all areas in which the board as a technical matter has the power to act. As 
developed in this section, the state corporate statutes illuminate areas 
 
 
 117. Just as Blasius protected the shareholder franchise, Delaware recently acted to protect the 
board’s rights from the shareholders. See Gorman v. Salamone, C.A. No. 10183-VCN, 2015 WL 
4719681, at *4–6 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015) (invalidating shareholder-adopted bylaw that empowered 
shareholders to remove company officers). 
 118. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). Unfortunately, the 
Delaware courts have cabined Blasius to the shareholders’ right to vote. Moreover, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has weakened the opinion by lamenting its demanding standard. Williams v. Geier, 
671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) (“Blasius’ burden of demonstrating ‘compelling justification’ is 
quite onerous, and . . . therefore [should be] applied rarely.”). It is also observed that the Delaware 
courts do not consider, as logic would suggest, demanding that the board explain its conduct thwarting 
shareholder action when, as in Blasius, the circumstances support the conclusion that the board could 
have sought shareholder approval for its actions. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE ORDERING 287 
 
 
 
 
where there should be no less than a rebuttable presumption that the board 
lacks authority to act.  
The board as a general matter has authority to amend the bylaws, but it 
is a power divined within the richer environment of principles and tenets 
of corporate law. Chancellor Allen isolated one such tenet: the shareholder 
franchise to elect and hence nominate directors.
119
 It would seem a small 
step, but of immense effect, to extend this franchise more generally to the 
right of shareholders to vote. To be sure, corporate statutes condition 
consummation of certain transactions as well as each individual director’s 
membership on the board’s being elected by the shareholders. Moreover, 
the shareholders’ authority to adopt bylaws empowers shareholders with 
authority to act on matters of process germane to their authority to so vote, 
and presumably to vote on matters otherwise linked to rights they enjoy, 
thereby extending the scope of their franchise.
120
 Post-Blasius decisions 
have therefore recognized shareholder voting as such a protectable right.
121
 
A further area of shareholders’ rights is the right to information bearing 
on the corporation’s financial position and performance as well as 
information germane to their status as shareholders. While only about one-
half of the states require that financial information on the firm be 
periodically provided to the shareholders,
122
 as a matter of common law, 
supplemented by statutory provisions, shareholders have reasonable 
information rights that enable access to the records in the company’s 
possession.
123
 Even though such access is conditioned on the shareholder 
having a proper purpose, access to information in the corporation’s 
possession is unquestionably among the items within the shareholders’ 
franchise.  
Another important shareholder franchise is the shareholder’s right to 
sell her shares. This area of corporate law provides important lessons on 
the franchise’s protection, as well as the limited instances in which the 
 
 
 119. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660–61. 
 120. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (upholding the 
shareholder-initiated bylaw authorizing the reimbursement of proxy contest expenses in non-control 
situations, albeit holding that the particular bylaw failed to limit such reimbursement to instances not 
in conflict with the board’s fiduciary obligations). 
 121. See, e.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003) (using the 
Blasius compelling justification standard to evaluate the defensive actions that prevented shareholders 
from being able to elect a successor director). Delaware has nonetheless restricted Blasius to voting 
contexts. See Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376 (holding that Blasius applies only when shareholders are not 
given a full and fair chance to vote); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 330–
31 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that Blasius was not implicated by a provision that had the effect of 
preventing a single holder from accumulating more than 20 percent of the stock). 
 122. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 16.20 (4th ed. 2013). 
 123. See 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 29, § 13.3. 
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legislature has employed the contractual paradigm in the corporate law. 
The twin considerations of the early common law’s strong embrace of the 
free alienability of property
124
 and the belief that the ability to exit an 
investment is one of the few options available to an unhappy minority 
holder
125
 led courts to view share-transfer restrictions skeptically. 
Nonetheless, restrictions on transfer are justified by a number of 
reasonable considerations that serve the interests of the corporation and/or 
its owners. Consider the insight of Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
“Stock in a corporation is not merely property. It also creates a personal 
relation analogous otherwise than technically to a partnership. . . . [T]here 
seems to be no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one’s 
associates in a corporation than in a firm.”126 
Today, the corporate statutory provisions broadly accord validity to 
share-transfer restrictions, albeit with all the features of the law of 
contracts.
127
 For example, a line of cases holds that even though a bylaw 
imposing a stock-transfer restriction may be invalid, the restriction is 
nonetheless enforceable as a contract if consent and consideration exist.
128
 
A far more important effect of the contract-oriented approach is that it 
removes from consideration the particular terms of the transfer restriction 
in assessing the reasonableness and hence validity of the particular 
restriction. Thus, a restriction consented to such that a contract can be 
found is not unreasonable and hence not invalid on the ground it deprives 
the transferring shareholder of a “fair price.”  
The most significant contract law feature of the regulation of share-
transfer restrictions is the necessity of consent for a restriction to apply to 
a holder’s shares. State law commonly provides that a restriction 
introduced after shares have been issued does not apply to shares unless 
the shares were voted in favor of the restriction.
129
 Sandor Petroleum 
 
 
 124. 17 WILLISTON, supra note 67, § 51.64. 
 125. See 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 29, § 14.9. The fact that we rarely find share transfer 
restrictions in non-close corporastions, see generally David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First 
Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11 (1999), reflects the high premium non-close-corporation 
owners place on the liquidity of their ownership interest. 
 126. Barrett v. King, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (Mass. 1902). 
 127. See, e.g., Coury v. Moss, 529 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 128. B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.2d 818, 822–23 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(citing Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 91 
N.E. 991 (Ohio 1910)). 
 129. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(b) (2015) (“No restrictions so imposed shall be 
binding with respect to securities issued prior to the adoption of the restriction unless the holders of the 
securities are parties to an agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 6.27(a) (2007) (“A restriction does not affect shares issued before the restriction was adopted unless 
the holders of the shares are parties to the restriction agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE ORDERING 289 
 
 
 
 
Corp. v. Williams
130
 is illustrative of the common law that the board of 
directors cannot adopt a bylaw that conditions any sale on first providing 
the corporation with the option to purchase the shares at a price 
determined by an arbitrator.
131
 The court reached this result even though 
the state statute authorized reasonable transfer restrictions to be imposed 
through the bylaws and authorized the board to amend company bylaws.
132
 
While broadly framing the issue within the strong public policy favoring 
the free alienation of property that as a general proposition qualifies the 
broad grant of authority to the board, the court, similar to the reasoning 
above, observed that the board’s authority with respect to its powers, 
including the exercise of its statutory authority to amend the bylaws, was 
limited to matters germane to the corporation’s operations and not the 
affairs of the stockholders.
133
  
The prevailing view that transfer restrictions cannot be imposed on a 
non-consenting shareholder underscores that, absent express statutory 
authority to the contrary, individually held shareholder rights cannot be 
changed with respect to the individual shareholder without that 
shareholder’s consent.   
 
 
A notable outlier in the common law on this issue is provided by the California Supreme Court in 
Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 391 P.2d 828, 830 (Cal. 1964), holding that an amendment to the 
articles of incorporation or bylaws adopted by majority vote could impose a transfer restriction on 
shares of non-consenting shareholders. Id. The court viewed share-transfer restrictions no differently 
than so many activities and transactions within the corporate setting where decisions impacting all 
owners are by majority vote. Id. Contemporary criticism of Tu-Vu Drive-In emphasizes the opinion’s 
inattention to the restriction’s adverse impact on the value of the shares, even in the relatively benign 
setting in Tu-Vu Drive-In where the overall effect of the bylaw was to prolong the sale process so that 
the corporation could exercise its option to purchase the shares at the same price as offered by the 
third-party purchaser. John K. McNulty, Corporations and the Intertemporal Conflict of Laws, 55 
CALIF. L. REV. 12, 27 (1967). Tu-Vu Drive-In remains an aberration and indeed has since been 
overruled by the legislature, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(b) (West 2015), so that California is now 
aligned with all other states in justifying share restrictions on the overarching principle of contract law: 
only consenting parties are bound by a contract. See 1 WILLISTON, supra note 67, § 1.3. The prevalent 
position in American corporate law is that the strong public policy favoring the transferability of 
shares conditions the restriction on consent. With the consent-contract orientation, the reasonableness 
of a restriction’s terms is removed from considering whether the restriction is enforceable. See B & H 
Warehouse, 490 F.2d at 826 (distinguishing Tu-Vu Drive-In on grounds that restriction upheld there 
required fair value be paid for shares, so its impact was solely to identify to whom the shares would be 
sold, whereas the restriction in the principal case required shares be sold at a book value that was 
substantially below the fair market value, so that restriction in its application was not deemed to be 
reasonable). 
 130. 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959). 
 131. Id. at 616–17. 
 132. Id. at 618. 
 133. Id. at 619. 
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The weight of corporate authority with respect to the necessity of 
stockholder consent for transfer restrictions conflicts with Boilermakers’ 
approach that the bylaws are themselves a contract whose amendment, 
even unilaterally by the board of directors, binds all shareholders.
134
 
Contrast Boilermakers’ approach with that in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 
Inc. v. Conoco, Inc.
135
 Striking down a share restriction sought to be 
imposed on a non-consenting shareholder, the court reasoned that not to 
require consent would “produce the incongruous result of allowing the 
Board of Directors unilaterally to impose stock transfer restrictions . . . . 
[T]he Legislature could not reasonably have intended to produce such 
onerous results.”136 This statement contrasts sharply with the board’s 
unilateral action approved in both Boilermakers and ATP Tour. Just as the 
shareholder franchise includes her power to sell shares, so it extends to the 
power to sue for misconduct by corporate fiduciaries. Thus, of those 
components of the shareholder’s franchise must be protected such that 
unilateral action by the board of directors that intrudes on this space must 
be jealously regarded. It was in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons but was not in 
Boilermakers and ATP Tour.  
VI. CONCLUSION—THE PATH FORWARD 
It is not likely that shareholder rights can be ranked into a defensible 
hierarchy where one set of rights, the right to sell shares, can be affected 
only pursuant to express statutory authority, while another set of rights, the 
right to nominate and vote for directors, is conditioned on some high 
fiduciary standard, for example a compelling justification, and all other 
rights are examined ex post for their fairness. Not only does it seem 
unreasonable to accord rights varying orders of importance, but to do so 
ignores the important impact of circumstances that invariably change from 
situation to situation. To be sure, fiduciary duty law, as observed earlier, 
derives its vitality from ex post consideration in the context of factually 
rich circumstances. But the point developed here is that the issue is not 
whether a wrong has been committed, but whether the board had the 
power to act. Clothing important organic questions such as those raised in 
Boilermakers and ATP Tour as a fiduciary inquiry ignores the structure of 
corporate law. To be sure, fiduciary duties apply to the exercise of powers 
enjoyed by the board. But the first question is whether the board had the 
 
 
 134. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939–41 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 135. 519 F. Supp. 506 (D. Del. 1981). 
 136. Id. at 513–14. 
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authority to act on that matter. Both Boilermakers and ATP Tour 
understood this to be the question, but answered it incorrectly as being 
contractually decided, when in fact there was no contract and could not be 
such a contract. Corporations act through contracts, but they are not 
contracts. 
Thus, the board enjoys a strong and well-justified presumption of 
propriety with respect to matters within its charge: managing and 
overseeing the management of the corporation’s affairs.137 The 
shareholders’ rights are limited. They can be found in various places in the 
corporate statute. Statutes contemplate that shareholders can initiate 
derivative suits. Law recognizes that when one is harmed by another in 
tort, suit for redress exists. These are rights of the shareholder, and there 
should be no less than a strong presumption that the board of directors 
lacks the authority to affect those rights unless expressly authorized by the 
prevailing corporate statute. Even where so authorized, an informed 
legislature should ask why it is that the board alone should have the power 
to act when impacting a right historically enjoyed by the shareholders. 
Much like a bylaw that classifies the board of directors of a Delaware 
corporation (which in Delaware requires shareholder approval),
138
 public 
policy should at a minimum condition the change on shareholder approval. 
The Author supports most forms of forum-selection bylaws. Because 
forum-selection bylaws can be seen as a sensible solution to multi-forum 
litigation, there is every reason to believe shareholders would approve 
such bylaws.
139
 Therefore, the need for unilateral action that can cast doubt 
on the directors’ fidelity to the shareholders appears weak. 
Regardless of the better approach for instituting an antidote for multi-
forum litigation, this Article calls for courts to divert course from the 
deceptive nature of the nexus-of-contracts approach and return to the 
corporate statute to divine the relative rights of the board vis-à-vis the 
 
 
 137. Correlative to the position developed in this Article is the decision in Gorman v. Salamone, 
C.A. No. 10183-VCN, 2015 WL 4719681 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015) (invalidating removal of the CEO 
pursuant to a bylaw recently adopted by the majority holder empowering shareholders to remove 
officers upon a majority vote). Just as the majority shareholder in Gorman could not prevail on the 
argument that he had broad power to amend bylaws to invade the prerogatives of the board to fire 
officers, so it is that the board’s encroachment on the shareholders’ franchise should be protected from 
assaults in the case of contracting through broadly-drafted grants of authority to amend the bylaws. 
 138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2015). 
 139. Although a sensible solution, forum-selection bylaws adopted unilaterally by the board of 
directors do not address the fundamental question raised in this Article; namely, the board’s power to 
act unilaterially on this topic. Because forum-selection bylaws are sensible, there is no reason for the 
board not to present a forum-selection bylaw for the shareholders’ approval. Indeed, the infinite 
sensibility of the solution to the problem erodes the case for the board to act preemptively.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
292 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:257 
 
 
 
 
shareholders. By casting aside the agenda that comes with the metaphor, 
authority to act can be better placed in the corporate statute, where the 
rights of owners can be found. Where those rights exist, just as they were 
found in Blasius, the board lacks the authority to act alone. 
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